Thailand and Egypt: The Generals Take Over

Recently Thailand underwent a military coup, with the country's top military commander, General Prayuth Chan-ocha, taking power after months of political tension. This is hardly Thailand's first military coup (it has had a dozen in the last 80 or so years) or even its first in recent years (the last one was in 2006), and I'll admit to a certain initial sympathy with Prayuth's decision to take charge. Thailand has been in the grip of a long, intractable political struggle that dates back to the 2006, in which the military overthrew Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Thaksin, a billionaire telecommunications tycoon, had governed as a populist, with initiatives that won him popularity with many of Thailand's poorer people, particularly in the northeast. While working to benefit the poor is a good thing, many of Thaksin's policies amounted to little more than handing out cash, rather than dealing with underlying issues. Also, he had a distinct authoritarian streak, showing little tolerance for dissent. Between his family's media properties and the state media, he controlled most of the major media sources. His war on drugs amounted to an extrajudicial slaughter of small-time drug dealers, letting bigger ones (including, most likely, some police officials who conveniently eliminated potential witnesses in the process) get away. He was friendly with the brutal dictatorship in Burma (Myanmar). There is plenty of reason to believe he was corrupt, using his position to benefit himself and his family interests. So there were many reasons why his loss of power didn't seem like a bad thing, even if it took a coup to accomplish it.

But Thaksin, who has been in exile since the 2006 coup, remains very popular among rural Thais and the urban poor, and in subsequent elections, parties linked to him triumphed every time. He was hated by the Bangkok-based establishment and the middle class, who succeeded in toppling several pro-Thaksin governments through court actions and protests, while major protests in 2010 by the pro-Thaksin Red Shirts against an unelected pro-establishment government ended in violence. But the most recent election in 2011 saw Thaksin's sister, Yingluck, win power as prime minister. Though she was able to remain in power without major difficulty for two years, a failed attempt to pass an amnesty law that might have allowed her brother to return led to massive protests against her and counter-protests by supporters, paralyzing Thailand politically for many months. Neither side showed any willingness to compromise, and even after a ruling by a pro-establishment court removed Yingluck from power, the stalemate between the caretaker government she left behind and the anti-Thaksin forces remained intractable. What's more, unlike the case in some other political struggles, neither side clearly had right on their side.

The problems with the anti-Thaksin forces are almost as numerous as those with Thaksin himself. The clear impression they give is that their main objection to Thaksin and those allied with him is that the latter threaten the established order. In other words, they are mostly conservatives who just want to ensure their continued dominance of Thailand's society. The leader of the protests against Yingluck's government, a former deputy prime minister named Suthep, regularly called for the reins of government to be taken over by an appointed council that would institute electoral reforms before elections would be held again. He was never specific about either how this council should be appointed or what kind of electoral reforms he wanted. What was clear, though, was he and others among the opposition mainly wanted to do whatever it took to ensure that the pro-Thaksin forces wouldn't be able to win yet another election. As I have recently pointed out, elections are hardly the panacea that some tend to see them as. However, this does not mean that undemocratic efforts aimed simply at keeping power in the hands of one faction in the society are worth supporting. Another indication of the anti-Thaksin faction's conservatism is their emphasis on loyalty to the monarchy. While my overall impression of King Bhumibol Adulyadej is favorable, neither he nor the monarchy as an institution should be absolutely inviolate. However, in Thailand, strict lese majesty laws allow people to be prosecuted for the mildest of negative or even just irreverent statements about the king or the royal family. The anti-Thaksin forces claimed that Thaksin was less than fully devoted to the king, and it seems quite possible that he might have wanted to lessen respect for the monarchy to help boost his own political dominance. But that doesn't mean that the monarchy should be completely above criticism, and the excessive devotion to the royal family shown by Thaksin's opponents is not a mark in their favor.

So given that both sides were flawed and resistant to any compromise, in some ways I could sympathize when Prayuth, after months of keeping the military on sidelines, finally got fed up and took over, detaining many of the leaders on both sides. But the more I read about Prayuth, the less favorable my impression of him is. As the article above notes, he has shown himself to be, like many on the anti-Thaksin side, a very conservative supporter of the monarchy, to the point of telling academics who were discussing reforming the lese majesty laws that if they didn't like things the way they were they should leave the country. The article also mentions that he was one of those who advocated use of force in cracking down on pro-Thaksin protests in 2010. He has a short temper and has little tolerance for dissent. So while I didn't really think much of either of the conflicting political factions, Prayuth doesn't seem like much of an improvement, and he may prove to be worse. I only hope he doesn't end up being as bad as some of the military rulers Thailand has had in the past. In any case, I'm now inclined to believe the US was right to strongly condemn Prayuth's takeover – even if the contrast with the reaction to the Egyptian army's takeover in that country shows a certain inconsistency.

Speaking of Egypt, the leader of that military takeover, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, was just elected president, a result that was long ago a foregone conclusion. But this is no more a cause for celebration than Prayuth's takeover. Despite the many flaws in the Muslim Brotherhood-led government that al-Sisi overthrew, he is in many ways worse. Certainly the human rights situation has deteriorated seriously under his rule, with not only the basically non-violent Muslim Brotherhood being subjected to a brutal crackdown but also many secular dissidents being arrested. However, al-Sisi has been dealt a blow in these very elections that he won overwhelmingly. While he was in no danger of losing, since the media has been constantly singing al-Sisi's praises and the campaign workers of his single opponent seemingly faced regular harassment, it appears that the Egyptian public is not nearly as enthusiastic about al-Sisi as his supporters have led everybody to believe. Al-Sisi himself called for a turnout of up to 80%, in comparison with 52% who voted in the election that saw the Msulim Brotherhood's Mohamed Mursi become the first freely elected president in Egyptian history. But turnout on the first day was poor, so the second day of voting was declared a public holiday, the pro-Sisi media castigated non-voters as traitors, and non-voters were threatened with fines. Even that didn't bring turnout up sufficiently, so in desperation the government extended voting for a third day. Even with all that, turnout apparently fell short of 50%, and some suggest that even the low official numbers may be inflated. If al-Sisi is sensible, he will react by doing more to win over those who boycotted the elections, including Brotherhood supporters by governing more like a democratic ruler who tolerates dissent and less like an autocrat who tries to crush his opponents with force. If not, at least he has received a well-deserved blow to his power.

Incidentally, talking of military suppression of dissent, next week will see the 25th anniversary of the massacre of protesters in Tienanmen Square in Beijing, China on June 4 and 5, 1989. While much has changed in China since then, many of the worst things have not. Dissent is still suppressed, human rights are still violated routinely, and the government still refuses to acknowledge that what happened in 1989 was an unjustified and brutal suppression of peaceful protestors, not a righteous act. I hope that people and countries from around the world will pause in their rush to do business with China and remember what happened 25 years ago and reflect that today's Chinese government is in most respects no less authoritarian than the one that slaughtered hundreds of Chinese civilians back then.