War Returns to Iraq

The big story internationally in the past week has been the sudden sweep through large parts of Iraq by the radical Islamist group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (or alternately Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham). ISIS (or ISIL) has taken over a considerable amount of territory, including Mosul, Iraq's second largest city, and Tikrit, Saddam Hussein's hometown. The Iraqi army in the area simply collapsed, and ISIS has executed hundreds of captured Iraqi soldiers (from what I recall, the group has performed even more brutal killings in Syrian territory it controls). This is clearly a nasty bunch, so much so that even al-Qaeda, a former ally, has disowned them (in fact, al-Qaeda allied Islamist groups in Syria have in places teamed up with secular rebel groups to fight ISIS, though unfortunately such in-fighting among rebels has helped Syria's leader Assad). Though rivalry no doubt has played a role in al-Qaeda's disapproval, from what I remember al-Qaeda specifically condemned some of ISIS's most brutal acts in Syria, much as they condemned Boko Haram's kidnapping of the girls in Nigeria. This isn't to say that al-Qaeda is a bunch of nice guys. Rather, it shows how horrible ISIS is, since even al-Qaeda thinks they go too far.

Unsurprisingly, many, including apparently the Iraqi government, are urging the US to consider airstrikes against ISIS. What's more, many American right-wingers are blaming US President Barack Obama for the Iraqi military collapse. As Jon Stewart quite reasonably (and of course amusingly) pointed out, many of these critics have in the past been so completely wrong about Iraq that we have no reason to listen to them anyway. Even if we ignore the fact that these American neocons are ultimately responsible for the chaos in Iraq because they led the US into invading it using false justifications such as WMDs and al-Qaeda connections, we should question their current assertion that if some US forces had been left in Iraq – and of course they blame Obama for not ensuring that some stayed, even though it was Bush who first signed the agreement setting the withdrawal date and it was the Iraqis who refused to agree to negotiate an agreement letting some American soldiers remain – this wouldn't have happened. While the US troop surge probably played a role in dampening down the insurgency in Iraq, the main factor was the co-opting of Sunni leaders who were persuaded to join in the fight against the radical groups. What has caused many Sunnis to now welcome, or at least not resist, ISIS is the behavior of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in recent years. His rule has been very divisive, clearly favoring the interests of his fellow Shiites over the Sunnis, as noted in this article. Human rights violations have also been severe, and again Sunnis have suffered disproportionately. The mere presence of a few US troops would hardly have been enough to counter the resentment that the Maliki government has generated with their heavy-handed behavior. If Obama should be blamed for anything, it should be for failing to strongly criticize Maliki's behavior, even at the risk of driving him even closer to Iran than he already is, or for failing to put pressure on him to step aside when Iyad Allawi out-polled him in the 2010 elections.

Leaving the question of blame aside, what should be done now? A number of organizations I receive emails from have been active in petitioning against US airstrikes, but I have been reluctant to sign on, not because I support airstrikes, but because I'm hesitant to completely rule them out. ISIS is clearly awful; based on what I've heard, they are probably worse than the Taliban. Some have talked about a diplomatic solution, but if by that they mean one involving ISIS, I think they are dreaming. However, there is certainly room for diplomacy involving both the Iraq government and local Sunni leaders. In fact, I think the US should insist that any substantial support that it gives to the Maliki government be contingent on Maliki taking immediate, concrete steps to improve the lot of the Sunnis and reduce sectarian tensions. Unfortunately, the fact that his allies are even now trying to pin responsibility for the Iraqi army's collapse on the Kurds, and Maliki's own wild hints about conspiracies and foreign meddling, indicate that he hasn't learned anything from this disaster. Until he does, or he is replaced by a more sensible ruler, it's hard to hold out much hope that Iraq's situation will improve any time soon.